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I. INTRODUCTION
In a course of decisions stretching back 100 years, the
United States Supreme Court has struggled to formulate an anal-
ysis of the military justice system.' While taking into account the
needs of the military, such an analysis would have to be, in
addition, both explicable and acceptable to the civilian popula-
tion and legal tradition. Although it had decided individual
cases, until the 1974 case of Parker v. Levy 2 the Court was not
forced to articulate a complete analysis of why the military justice
system should be treated differently from a civilian system. Prior
cases provided hints, but their facts allowed the Court to limit its
decisions and appear to be merely fine tuning a system that
differed from our civilian system only in certain narrow aspects
required by the nature of any military operation.
Levy will not bear such an easy and accommodating con-
struction. The Supreme Court there upheld the two so-called
general articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).3 These provisions have no American civilian counter-
part and on their face appear to outlaw anything and everything
that a commanding officer dislikes. The Levy majority tried to
explain the validity of such rules in the military context, but
failed to articulate its view of the social structure underlying the
military justice system and of the Constitution's place in it. Any
justification of the result in Levy, however, requires a radically
t B.A. 1972, Colgate University; J.D. 1975, University of Pennsylvania. Member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
The author would like to express his appreciation and gratitude to Professor Mir-
jan Damalka. His ideas, encouragement, and criticism were invaluable. Any errors or
oversights are, of course, the author's responsibility.
' See generally Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3 (1970);
Zillman & Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Soci-
ety Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 396 (1976).
2 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
3 Id. The general articles are reprinted at text accompanying notes 9 & 10 infra.
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different view of military society and its relation to the Constitu-
tion than the Court holds of civilian society.
This Article will present a model of the military justice sys-
tem that the author believes underlies the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Levy. Within the framework of this model the decision is
coherent and defensible. The author does not claim that the
model presented herein describes military life with perfect accu-
racy. Moreover, the mere presentation of the model does not in
itself answer the questions of the constitutionality or the morality
of the military justice system in general.4 Such a presentation is
nonetheless a prerequisite to an understanding of these ques-
tions and the manner in which the Supreme Court answered
them.
The issues separating reformers and defenders of the cur-
rent system rest ultimately on moral judgments about the desir-
ability of societal structures-not limited to the military-that
follow certain patterns. Recognizing this may center and focus
the debate and lead legislators and other writers to examine the
questions here exposed. The conceptual underpinnings of our
military justice system may, upon full examination, be found
either good or bad. Until the conceptual issues are defined,
however, we have no ground to make any judgment at all.
II. PARKER V. LEVY
Captain Levy was a physician stationed in South Carolina.
He was, at least technically, a volunteer.5 In late 1966 his
superior officer discovered that Levy had been neglecting his
duty of training Special Forces aide men. A specific order to
conduct the training was given, which Levy refused to obey on
the ground of his medical ethics. He also made several public
statements that were taken to be inflammatory by his military
superiors. In one case he said:
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet
Nam War. I would refuse to go to Viet Nam if ordered
to do so. I don't see why any colored soldier would go to
In fact, the author believes that a "hybrid family-life" model of the military, de-
veloped in this Article, is a close approximation of the reality of life in the armed
forces. He also believes that this reality is morally and constitutionally adequate to pre-
serve the essence of fairness in an institution devoted to discipline and warfare. Though
this Article makes suggestions along these lines, see text accompanying notes 130-33
infra, a full evaluation of these problems must wait for another time.
Levy's military career is reviewed in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND 166-84 (J. Finn
ed. 1971).
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Viet Nam: they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if
sent should refuse to fight because they are discrimi-
nated against and denied their freedom in the United
States, and they are sacrificed and discriminated against
in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty and
they are suffering the majority of casualties. If I were a
colored soldier I would refuse to go to Viet Nam and if
I were a colored soldier and were sent to Viet Nam I
would refuse to fight. Special Forces personnel are liars
and thieves and killers of peasants and murderers of
women and children.
6
Although they originally contemplated bringing nonjudicial
proceedings against Levy,7 his superiors later decided to bring a
general court-martial against him. He was convicted of disobey-
ing orders8 and violating Articles 133 and 134-the general
articles--of the UCMJ. Article 133 provides:
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman shall be punished as the court-martial may
direct.9
Article 134 states:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter [the
penal provisions of the Code], all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not
capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special,
or summary court-martial, according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the dis-
cretion of that court.'
0
6 417 U.S. at 736-37.
Nonjudicial disciplinary proceedings are available under Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, Art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). See text accompanying notes 58-63, 81-84
infra.
8 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 737. The conviction was under Uniform Code of
Military Justice, Art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970).
9 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). For a discus-
sion of the general article, see Gaynor, Prejudicial and Discreditable Military Conduct: A
Critical Appraisal of the General Article, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 259 (1971). This Article is con-
cerned with the first two clauses of Article 134, involving conduct prejudicial to good
order and discipline and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed ser-
1976]
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Levy was charged, under Article 134, with making statements
designed to promote disloyalty among the troops."' Much the
same statements were charged, under Article 133, to be "in-
temperate, defamatory, provoking, disloyal, contemptuous, and
disrespectful to Special Forces personnel and to enlisted person-
nel who were patients or under his supervision.' 1 2 Levy's convic-
tion was upheld by the military appellate system. 13 He then
sought habeas corpus in the federal civil courts. The district
court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed,'14 holding Articles 133 and 134 void for vague-
ness. The Supreme Court reversed.
15
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, relied
heavily on the concept that the military is a separate and
specialized society.
This Court has long recognized that the military is,
by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society. We have also recognized that the military has,
again by necessity, developed traditions of its own dur-
ing its long history .... In In re Grimley the Court ob-
served: "An army is not a deliberative body. It is the
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience . . . ." More
recently we noted that "[t]he military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate disci-
pline from that of the civilian ......
Just as military society has been a society apart
from civilian society, so "[mlilitary law ... is a jurispru-
dence which exists separate and apart from the law
which governs in our federal judicial establishment.'
' 6
The opinion then moved to a consideration of the general arti-
cles themselves, and countered the argument that the articles
were unconstitutionally vague with a two-pronged attack. First,
the Court felt that "the long-standing customs and usages of
vices. The section on crimes and offenses not capital is a separate unit, and deals with
those acts and omissions that are not punished by the UCMJ but that are made crimes
or offenses by Congress. In that section the offenses can be known as such in the same
way civilian criminal offenses are known, even though they are not specifically listed in
the UCMJ. See Gaynor, supra, at 261-64.
11 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 738 (1974).
12 Id. at 739.
13 Id. at 740 & n.7.
14 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
" 417 U.S. 733 (1974). For an overview of the Court's decision here and in similar
cases, see Everett, Military Justice in the Wake of Parker v. Levy, 67 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1975).
16 417 U.S. at 743-44 (citations omitted).
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the services impart meaning to the seemingly imprecise stan-
dards of Arts. 133 and 134.' Concurring, Justices Blackmun
and Burger found that the moral precepts underlying the arti-
cles had remained unchanged since at least 1642.8 The Court
quoted with approval language from the 1857 case of Dynes v.
Hoover:
Notwithstanding the apparent indeterminateness of
such a provision, it is not liable to abuse; for what those
crimes are, and how they are to be punished, is well
known by the practical men in the navy and army, and
by those who have studied the law of courts martial, and
the offenses of which the different courts martial have
cognizance.' 9
Further, because each article had been construed by the United
States Court of Military Appeals (the highest tribunal within the
military justice system) or by other military authorities, the Court
maintained that the scope of each article had been narrowed and
clarified sufficiently to pass constitutional muster.
20
The Court's arguments that such narrowing constructions
exist are not convincing. Cases interpreting these articles show
only what is being penalized; they provide little guide to what
may be punished in the next case, as Justice Stewart notes in
dissent:
Article 133 has been recently employed to punish such
widely disparate conduct as dishonorable failure to pay
debts, selling whiskey at an unconscionable price to an
enlisted man, cheating at cards, and having an ex-
1 Id. at 746-47. Indeed, the Court traced the origin and usage of the general arti-
cles back to the Articles of the Earl of Essex of 1642. Id. at 745.
18 Id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 747 (quoting Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82 (1857)).
20Id. at 752-53. "Article 134 does not make 'every irregular, mischievous, or im-
proper act a court-martial offense,' but its reach is limited to conduct that is 'directly
and palpably-as distinguished from indirectly and remotely-prejudicial to good order
and discipline.' "Id. at 753 (citation omitted). Further:
"There are certain moral attributes which belong to the ideal officer and
gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty or unfair dealing,
of indecency or indecorum, or of lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not
everyone can be expected to meet ideal standards or to possess the attributes in
the exact degree demanded by the standards of his own time; but there is a
limit of tolerance below which an officer or cadet cannot fall without his being
morally unfit to be an officer or cadet or to be considered a gentleman. This
article contemplates such conduct by an officer or cadet which, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, satisfactorily shows such moral unfitness."
Id. at 777 n.12 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting B. REYNOLDS, THE OFFICER'S GUIDE
435-36 (1969 ed.)).
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tramarital affair. Article 134 has been given an even
wider sweep, having been applied to sexual acts with a
chicken, window peeping in a trailer park, and cheating
while calling bingo numbers.
21
The second prong of the Court's analysis is more important
to its understanding of military structure. The Court asserted
that prior constructions by military authorities, the means by
which outsiders can learn what activities are crimes under the
articles, are not the only sources of the insider's knowledge: "the
practical men in the navy and army" learn the scope of these
articles by being part of the military.22 That is, the general arti-
cles are reflective of the special relationship between the soldier
and the army:
While a civilian criminal code carves out a relatively
small segment of potential conduct and declares it crim-
inal, the Uniform Code of Military Justice essays more
varied regulation of a much larger segment of the ac-
tivities of the more tightly knit military community. In
civilian life there is no legal sanction-civil or crim-
inal-for failure to behave as an officer and a gentle-
man. 
23
The UCMJ is seen as informing the soldier's whole life, because
in general the government and the members of the military have
nothing less than a "whole-life" relationship. 24 "[The relation-
ship] is not only that of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of em-
ployer to employee. indeed, unlike the civilian situation, the
Government is often employer, landlord, provisioner, and law-
giver rolled into one. '25 This all-encompassing relationship be-
tween the military and the individual is the Court's strongest
justification for upholding the UCMJ's general articles. Even if
they are vague, and their constructions confusing, they are con-
stitutional because the Court finds them necessary to the func-
tioning of the military as a separate society.
26
21 Id. at 778-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
22 Id. at 747; see id. at 763 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 749.
24 Meaning that while an individual is in the armed services, the military surrounds
and touches his whole life, not that he can never get out.
25 417 U.S. at 751. This is not a recent perception. Military membership tradition-
ally has been considered a "status," with rights and duties unknown to the civilian soci-
ety. See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
26417 U.S. at 743, 744. See United States, v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45
C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972).
312
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Flexibility is necessary to any whole-life relationship, military
or otherwise. 27 Therefore, rather than trying to forsee all sanc-
tionable acts by members of the military, Congress has left a
general power to deal with such acts to the military itself. Accept-
ing, for the purposes of the current analysis, this view of the
military as a distinct and all-encompassing society, it is possible to
understand the Court's reasoning and to develop a new tool for
understanding military justice.
III. A PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN MILITARY JUSTICE
A. A Short History
Before the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950,28 the armed
services of the United States were governed by Articles of War.
29
In June 1775, the Second Continental Congress resolved to send
a military force to join the army near Boston, and appointed a
commission-one of whose members was George Washington
-to prepare rules and regulations to govern this Continental
Army. 30 At General Washington's request, these Articles were
later revised by a commission which included Thomas Jefferson
and John Adams. As Adams recorded it:
There was extant one system of articles of war, which
had carried two empires to the head of command, the
Roman and the British, for the British Articles of War
were only a literal translation of the Roman .... I was
therefore for reporting the British articles totidem verbis.
. .. The British articles were accordingly reported.
31
27 See text accompanying notes 66-93 infra.
28 Act of May 5, 1950, Pub. L. No. 506, ch. 169, § 1, 64 Stat. 107 (codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970)).
29 See generally Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6
VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953) (Professor Morgan was the chairman of the committee that
drafted the UCMJ).
3 0 See W. AYCOCK & S. WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE 9-10 (1955).
31 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 93 (1850), quoted in Morgan, supra note 29, at 169. The
Roman source of which Adams speaks and its later history are discussed by Gaynor:
Almost two thousand years ago a law of Arius Meander in the Roman
Digest provided that: 'Every disorder to the prejudice of general discipline is a
military offense, such as, for instance, the offense of laziness, or insolence, or
idleness.' The Articles of War of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, issued in 162 1,
made punishable whatever was not contained therein but was repugnant to
military discipline.
Gaynor, supra note 10, at 260. The United States added "all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the military service," but otherwise accepted this piece of history
almost verbatim. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
19761
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These were adopted in 1776 and were never fundamentally re-
done. The history of the articles themselves only serves to rein-
force what has been noted from the start: Military law tradition-
ally has been perceived as an entirely separate system from
civilian law.
32
Historically, courts-martial have not been regarded as courts
at all, but rather as "[I]nstrumentalities of the executive power, pro-
vided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to
aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforc-
ing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of
his authorized military representatives. '33 This view, in slightly
milder form, still commands a following.3 4 There is persuasive
evidence that a basic difference between the law applied to
civilians and that applied to people in the military was intended
originally, regardless of whether a court-martial was a "real"
court.35 Indeed, it seems that the framers of the Constitution
never considered the Bill of Rights applicable to persons in the
military.3 6 Early congresses went along with this inapplicability
premise,37 as did the Supreme Court, which noted that "the
power of Congress in the Government of the land and naval
forces of the militia is not at all affected by the fifth or any other
amendment. '38 This reflects a deep-seated view that the "rights"
of those in the military are not rights at all in the most rigorous
sense; they are a matter of the grace of Congress, which Con-
gress may decide to alter or abolish.39
This may serve to explain why certain seemingly odd fea-
tures of the current military justice system have escaped general
attack. For example, except in trials of crimes that carry a man-
32 See W. AYcoCK & S. WURFEL, supra note 30, at 8-9. See also United States v.
Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
33 1 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 53 (1886) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omit-
ted).
34 Cf-, e.g., Nichols, The Justice of Military Justice, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 482, 484
(1971).
3 5 See Note, Courts-Martial vs. Constitutional Guarantees, 17 U. PTr. L. REv. 454, 457
(1956).
'6 See Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 266, 294, 301-02 (1958). Contra, Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957).
11 See Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 127 (1964).
38 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 138 (1866) (dictum).
39 See Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 127 (1964). But see Henderson, supra note 36; cf. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738, 758 (1975) ("[I]t must be assumed that the military court system will vindi-
cate servicemen's constitutional rights.").
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datory death penalty, the UCMJ (and prior articles of war) never
required unanimous agreement for conviction.40 And the Mili-
tary Judge, who serves roughly the function of the judge in a
jury trial, is permitted to use the pretrial files to familiarize
himself with the case before it comes before him for trial.41 Tol-
erance for such procedures makes sense only upon the hy-
pothesis that the military justice system is not bound by the
constraints on civilian practice.
B. The Present General Articles: Sources of Conflict
In 1950 Congress amended, unified, and codified the mili-
tary justice system through the enactment of the UCMJ. 42 While
granting the right to counsel,43 and attempting to deal with the
most severe perceived problems of "command influence," 44 the
distinctive structure of the military justice system as a world
apart was left unimpaired. 45 For purposes of this Article, the
UCMJ's main feature is a negative one; it did not repeal the
general article that made punishable all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order not treated elsewhere in the UCMJ.
These broad provisions for punishing prejudicial or dis-
creditable conduct reflect the peculiar nature of the military jus-
tice system most clearly.
As early as 1896 Winthrop listed more than a
hundred different types of conduct which had resulted
in convictions under the general article. Some of the
more unusual were: (1) being offensively unclean in
person, (2) lawless conduct by a soldier resulting in his
civilian conviction and confinement which deprived the
40 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 52, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(2) (1970).
41 United States v. Mitchell, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 521, 36 C.M.R. 14, 19 (1965). It
would be fascinating to compare this use of files with the European custom of the judge
using a dossier containing all the evidence obtained before trial. See generally Dama~ka,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative
Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 517 n.16 (1973). Such a comparison is well beyond the
scope of the present Article, but casual research has convinced the author that the
overlap between military practice and the practice in European civil courts extends over
too many areas to be mere coincidence.
42 See note 28 supra.
43 See generally Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a
Civilian Defendant, 22 ME. L. REV. 105 (1970).
44 That is, pressure by the commanding officer (who convened the court-martial) to
influence the decision. See generally West, A History of Command Influence on the Military
Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1970).
'SBut see Sherman, supra note 1. For a brief history and overview of the UCMJ,
written by the chairman of the committee that drafted it, see Morgan, supra note 29.
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Government of a considerable portion of his enlisted
service, (3) a noncommissioned officer engaging in a
public sparring exhibition in a saloon.
46
Many unusual activities still are held to be criminal under this
section.47 Officers may find themselves held to an even higher
standard48 under Article 133 than that applied to enlisted per-
sonnel.
The majority and dissent in Levy joined issue over whether a
"reasonable military man" would know what conduct was pro-
hibited by these articles.49 Perhaps having the better of the argu-
ment that the general articles are not concrete, the dissent may
nonetheless have lost on the larger question of whether con-
creteness is necessarily a virtue in all aspects of the military jus-
tice structure. The disagreement between the majority and dis-
sent suggests a parallel between the present state of military law
and the growth of the civilian criminal common law. A system of
definitive statutes, giving advance notice of what conduct will be
punished, is a quite recent development in our criminal law.
Needless to say a primitive people does not in the be-
ginning enact an exhaustive and thoroughly integrated
code of laws. By usage and custom certain rules come to
be accepted . . . for dealing with those who commit
misdeeds of a seriously antisocial nature. Hence there
gradually develops a complicated set of rules, princi-
ples, concepts and standards which are enforced by the
courts although they have never been adopted by any
legislative enactment. 50
Cast in these terms, the Levy dissent is claiming that it is funda-
mentally unfair (violates due process) to subject an individual in
the military to a part of the military law because the entire mili-
tary justice system is not sufficiently developed. It is just too
"primitive," particularly in comparison with civilian justice, to be
forced on an individual. In Levy's case, the compulsion to accept
the general articles as part of his code of conduct was real, even
46 Gaynor, supra note 10, at 266 (footnotes omitted).
4 See id. 267-85.
4 Gaynor, supra note 10, at 285.
49See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra. Defenders of the present system are
prone to argue that a reasonable military man would know what conduct is prohibited.
See, e.g., J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE 87-88 (1974). But see Bruton, Book Review, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
50 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 22 (1957).
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though he technically "volunteered" for induction. The dissent's
description of him as "a draft-induced volunteer"51 seems accu-
rate, for had he not "volunteered" he would have been drafted
and made subject to the same system anyway. If, in fact, Levy
had a right to a system comparable in development to our civil
one, it is fairly clear he did not waive that right.52 Yet once the
dissenters grant the legitimacy of an entire military system sepa-
rate and distinct from our civilian one, and once they grant
further that society can compel its citizens to become part of this
separate system, it is difficult to justify singling out the justice
system for condemnation simply because it is too "primitive" in
comparison with the civilian; the two initial concessions vitiate
the force of the argument that the two systems must be the same
in all respects.
But, it may be suggested, this analysis puts the burden of
going forward on the wrong party. We have had a separate
military system, this voice argues, and we may need to keep it
separate in some areas. Why, however, should we tolerate such
separateness when it comes to something as basic as knowing
what acts are punishable? Surely it is up to the defenders of the
military to justify this throwback to a more primitive era. The
traditional defenders of the military justice system have tried to
meet just this argument.
C. The Traditional Justifications
In 1921 Dean Wigmore formulated what well may remain
the ultimate defense against allegations that military justice is
primitive or unfair:
Military justice wants discipline-that is, action in
obedience to regulations and orders; this being abso-
lutely necessary for prompt, competent, and decisive
handling of masses of men. The court-martial system
supplies the sanction of this discipline. It takes on the
features of Justice because it must naturally perform
the process of inquiring in a particular case, what was
the regulation or order, and whether it was in fact
obeyed. But its object is discipline.
53
51 417 U.S. at 782 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
52 See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver is an intentional
abandonment of a known right).
53 Wigmore, Lessons from Military Justice, 4 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 151 (1921). But see
Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at 402-04 (wide-ranging authority to punish may
1976]
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The need for discipline in the military, however, can explain
fully the military justice system only when we more completely
take into account the nature of the court-martial itself as per-
ceived by the military authorities:
In their opinion a court-martial is merely an agency
"appointed" by the commanding officer for the training
of soldiers in discipline, and though one is sentenced by
such a tribunal to death or to a long term of imprison-
ment, he is not deprived of life or liberty or in fact
punished at all, but merely trained and educated and
disciplined. A criminal sentence in the army, in short,
serves the same purposes as the manual of arms or the
setting up exercises, and must be cheerfully acquiesced
in, no matter how severe it may be, as it is but a part of
the school of the soldier.
54
Although the courts-martial-are-nothing-but-disciplinary-tools
argument may seem dated, it retains a powerful intellectual at-
traction. As recently as 1969 the Supreme Court noted that "[a]
court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice, but
remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall
mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." 55 Thus,
the military system is not a 'justice system" at all, but is purely a
training device. That it is more primitive than the civilian justice
system is irrelevant; the two systems have different purposes.
This is a radical approach, and has not been adopted or, in
some cases, perceived, by either side of the current military jus-
tice debate. To most people, a military trial has basically the
same function as does a civilian one. Even in the military, this
view has its adherents. General Westmoreland, for example, ob-
not be necessary in some cases, given the nature of modern military service).
Military commanders traditionally bemoan the lack of discipline in their troops,
and long for a return to the old-fashioned discipline of their fathers. Such sentiments
were voiced as far back as 40 B.C. by Roman commanders. Hodson, The Manual for
Courts-Martial-1984, 57 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972). During the Revolutionary War,
George Washington urged Congress to raise the limit on flogging from 39 to 100
lashes, claiming that military discipline needed the greater sanction in order to be effec-
tive. Id. 4-5. Criticism of the military justice system as failing sufficiently to provide the
needed discipline is also a military tradition, stretching back at least as far as our Civil
War. Id. 5 (quoting Robert E. Lee).
-' Bruce, Double Jeopardy & The Power of Review in the Court-Martial Proceedings, 3
Mim,. L. REV. 484. 489 (1919). But see Hodson, supra note 53.
5 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (footnote omitted). But cf.
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) ("[I]t must be assumed that the
military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights.").
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viously feels that military and civilian trials are directly compara-
ble: "A military trial should not have a dual function as an in-
strument of discipline and as an instrument of justice. It should
be an instrument of justice and in fulfilling this function it will
promote discipline. '5 6 Most reformers seem to be proceeding on
this basis.
57
Such an assumed comparability overlooks not only history,
but also the existence of nonjudicial punishment under Article
15 of the UCMJ. 58 Article 15 gives a commander discretion to
initiate action officially designated as "punishment" which does
not utilize a court-martial at all, and which results in "minor"
sanctions. 59 The soldier so disciplined can receive a court-martial
on demand, but risks a more severe punishment if he does so.
60
An analogue in the civilian system-the individual who formally
initiates the criminal prosecutions also having the power to im-
pose a "minor" punishment without trial-is difficult to imagine.
"The commanding officer needs this additional authority so
that he can correct a youngster by taking him out to the
woodshed, so to speak, without being forced to give him a sum-
mary court-martial for a minor infraction. 6 1 This justification
for nonjudicial punishment, made in Senate hearings, catches
the spirit of Article 15, while remaining true to its letter. In the
more formal terms of Army regulations, the purposes of Article
15 are to:
1) Correct, educate, and reform offenders who have
shown that they cannot benefit by less stringent
measures;
2) Preserve, in appropriate cases, an offender's record
of service from unnecessary stigmatization by record
of a court-martial conviction; and
Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's Viewpoznt, 10 Am. CIU. L. REv 5,
8 (1971).
-1 See, e.g., Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398
(1973); West, supra note 44, at 150-55; Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 1.
58 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). For some of
the interesting practical effects that the existence of nonjudicial punishment has on the
strategy of an accused, see Bruton, supra note 49, at 1485 n.14.
59 Compare Everett, Some Comments on the Role of Discretion in Military Justice, 37 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 171, 188-91 (1972), with Imwinkelried & Gilligan, The Unconstitu-
tional Burden of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 534 (1974).
60 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1970).
" Hearings on S.R. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 299 (1962) (Constitutional Rights of Military Per-
sonnel) (Statement of Z. Neff, Civilian Member, Navy Board of Review) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
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3) Further military efficiency by disposing of minor of-
fenses in a manner requiring less time and personnel
than trial by court-martial.
62
What the informal summary suggests more clearly than does the
formal version is that nonjudicial punishment rests on a particu-
lar view of the relationship of the commanding officer and the
soldier. 63 Although discipline must be maintained, it would be
wasteful and absurd to invoke the formal criminal process for
every minor infraction in a whole-life relationship.
D. Summary
This Article has suggested that the military justice system is
not directly comparable to our civilian system because it re-
sponds to different needs. Having suggested that the normal
comparison of civilian versus military justice system is not fruit-
ful, it is time to suggest a comparison that is. The taking-the-
youngster-to-the-woodshed justification of nonjudicial punish-
ment quoted above suggests a new analysis. Perhaps the military
justice system is, after all, a justice system, if not one based on
traditional adversary lines. 64 A new model is needed in order to
understand the system before it can be criticized adequately.
IV. MODELS OF MILITARY JUSTICE
It is received wisdom that our civilian criminal justice system
is "adversary" in nature. In such a system
[t]he fundamental matrix is based upon the view that
proceedings should be structured as a dispute between
two sides in a position of theoretical equality before a
court which must decide the outcome of the contest....
The protagonists of the model have definite, indepen-
dent, and conflicting functions: the prosecutor's role is
to obtain a conviction; the defendant's role is to block
this effort.
65
The model of the system is that of a battle between the govern-
ment and the defendant. This does not fully define the system,
of course; the type of battle waged can vary tremendously de-
62 Army Reg. No. 27-10, 3-4a (Dec. 12, 1973).
'3 See notes 66-74 infra & accompanying text.
" For a discussion of the distinguishing features of adversary and nonadversary
systems, see Dama~ka, supra note 41, at 563-64.
65 Damaka, supra note 41, at 563.
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pending on the strengths of the interests that are competing to
shape it.
There are, of course, other possible models for a system of
criminal justice. This section will set out one of them: the family
model. This model will be distinguished from the battle (adver-
sary) model, and then applied to the military.
A. The Family Model
In constructing a model for military justice along nonadver-
sary lines, the work of Karl Llewellyn provides a logical starting
point. Llewellyn presents a model for a criminal justice system
that he suggests is at work in our military system.66 Speaking of
the New Mexico Pueblo Indians, he observed:
Here is a completely different approach to prob-
lems of criminal law. Offenses are foreknown as such,
so far as experience is at hand, but hitherto unpre-
cedented offenses can be forefelt as such when they run
clearly counter to the tone and purpose of ongoing in-
stitutions. A "trial" lies half in an inquiry . . . . The
officials will go drum up evidence for him [the
"defendant"] on their own or at his instance. They want
to find him innocent: he is part of their team. What is
known as the "trial," the second half of the procedure,
is formal on the point of fact .... Its purpose is instead
to bring the erring brother, now known to be such, to
repentance, to open confession, and to reintegration
with the community of which he was and still is regarded
as an integral part. As contrasted with the arm's-length
attitudes, the law, the procedure, the treatment, the at-
titudes, the emotions are parental.67
This society is more homogeneous than American civil society.
The core of assumptions shared by its members is much larger
than that shared, for example, by Americans in general. A writ-
ten code exists, but uncodified offenses may be "forefelt" by the
people. Justice in this society may be called parental: punishment
is meant to take place without estrangement. The accused is not
"the defendant," but is treated as an erring brother.
66 K. LLEWELLYN, The Anthropology of Criminal Guilt, in JURISPRUDENCE 441, 449
(1962) (originally in the N.Y.U. Series on Social Meaning of Legal Concepts, CRIMINAL
GUILT 100 (1950)).67 Id. 447-48 (emphasis in original).
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Professor Griffiths proposed a variation of Llewellyn's con-
ceptualization, which he described as the "family" model.68 He
recognized that real punishment occurs within a family, but that
its nature is different from punishment by the authorities in
civilian society:
Although punishments are expected to and do come
out of the family's adjudication process, it is not a bitter
"struggle from start to finish." A parent and child have
far more to do with each other than obedience, deter-
rence, and punishment, and any process between them
will reflect the full range of their relationship .... 69
What we have called a whole-life relationship exists in the
family. 70 Unlike policeman and citizen, parent and child do not
meet each other principally in the disciplinary process, but in-
stead live together in total interaction.7 1 Whether naughty or
good the child remains part of the family-he is one of us, and is
not "the defendant."
The need for trust in public officials inheres in any nonad-
versary concept of criminal justice.7 2 These officials must be seen
to act in the best interests of both the erring brother and the
whole group. Without such trust, checks on official power are
sought, as individuals feel the need to be able to "fight" the
authorities and to resist rehabilitation. Such thinking is inconsis-
tent with a family model of justice, as Griffiths has argued in
detail.
73
A "family" system coerces strongly those members of the
society who do not share its assumptions. No member need
abuse the system for this coercion to occur: the structure itself
works to eliminate heterogeneity. 7 There is no mechanism
6 Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or a Third "Model" of the Criminal Process,
79 YALE L.J. 359, 371 (1970).
69 Id. 373 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
1o "Punishment is not something a child receives in isolation from the rest of his
relationship to the family ...." Id. 376.
1 Paradoxically, Griffiths seems to ignore this point in his treatment of the juvenile
court system. Id. 399-404. He focuses on the lack of "Family Model spirit" of love and
concern among public officials and the people at large. Id. 400. Yet it seems that his
whole family model structure is based on the idea that the parties are involved in a
whole-life relationship. For many children who come into contact with the juvenile
court system, this element of overarching relationship is absent.
72 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 444; Griffiths, supra note 68, at 380; cf.
Dama~ka, Structures of Authority & Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480,
532-33 (1975).
73 See Griffiths, supra note 68, at 367-4 10.
74 Other risks exist in a family-type system when those in power attempt to abuse
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within the structure to challenge the "tone and purpose of going
institutions" that pervades the society; each member of the fam-
ily knows his role, and there is no structural support for dissent.
This is in sharp contrast with the way in which the adversary
system supports the accused: opposition is expected and is the
defendant's right.
B. Distinguishing the Models
Properly distinguishing between the family and adversary
models of criminal justice requires an understanding of the in-
terests served by each and of the way in which those interests are
revealed in the structures and assumptions of the models. Her-
bert Packer identified two competing interests in the American
civilian criminal justice system: "crime control"-the efficient
repression of criminal conduct through speedy informal fact-
finding-and "due process"-the protection of the individual
from the coercive power of the state through formal and often
lengthy procedures. 75 Where crime control is the dominant pol-
icy, officials wish to screen out the "probably innocent" quickly.
Others then may be processed under a factual-as opposed to a
legal-presumption of guilt. The logical end point would be a
trialless system: either the suspect is exonerated in the adminis-
trative fact-finding process or he pleads guilty.7 6 The due pro-
cess policy, on the other hand, seeks to protect the factually
innocent, even at the expense of letting some of the guilty go
free. Where it dominates, no one should be convicted except on
the strongest proof, presented in the fairest possible proceed-
ings.
The adversary nature of the battle model emerges most
that power: "Let officials turn the machinery to work out a personal grudge; or to
enrich themselves corruptly; or to put down political dissent-and one begins to under-
stand why our forefathers, through the centuries, found it worth blood to win through
to measures which could partly control officials." K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 448.
75 H. PACKER, Two Models of the Criminal Process, in THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 149 passim (1968) (originally printed in 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964)). Packer
describes the two policies in terms of two "Models": "Crime Control" and "Due Pro-
cess." Id. 158, 163. They are not, however, models in the sense that this Article uses the
term. As Packer notes, "the Due Process Model is basically a negative model." Id. 173. It
is a second order system, made up solely of checks, consisting of modifications and
limits on some prior operative procedure, which the model does not define. As Profes-
sor Dama~ka has put it, "In its pure form it would lead not to an obstacle course, but
rather to mere obstacles and no course on which to place [them]." Dama~ka, supra note
41, at 575. Both "Due Process" and "Crime Control" are carried out in this country in
the context of a basically adversary system.
76 H. PACKER, supra note 75, at 160-62.
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clearly when due process interests dominate, because that is
when formal courtroom struggles occur most frequently. When
crime control is considered to be the chief aim of the criminal
justice system, however, the underlying structure remains that of
a battle. Even (perhaps especially) when administrative crim-
inal-detection procedures dominate the criminal justice struc-
ture, the sense of battle between the suspect and the government
is not diminished-the suspect is expected to resist detection and,
as a matter of right, to struggle within whatever structures re-
main to him. In any case, we have an "arm's length" system of
criminal law.77 As Griffiths noted: "Packer consistently portrays
the criminal process as a struggle-a stylized war-between two
contending forces whose interests are implacably hostile ...
[The two policies reflect] nothing more than alternative deriva-
tions from that conception of profound and irreconcilable dis-
harmony of interest.
'7 8
All this is antithetical to a family-type system in which the
society attempts to "bring the erring brother . . . to re-
pentance, '7 9 in which offenses grow not only from the written
law, which all can see and choose to obey, but from the spirit of
the society, and, as in the case of Article 15 military punish-
ments,80 in which discipline can sometimes be expected without
any formal procedure at all. Although some features of an ad-
versary system operating principally for the purpose of crime
control may look like parts of a family system, such as reliance
on "administrative" fact-finding, the underlying societal struc-
tures and the assumptions that need to be shared in order to
make the system work are different.
C. Application to Milita y Justice
The family model articulated above illuminates one prevail-
ing view of the military justice system that was a major compo-
nent of the Court's analysis in Levy and that is consistent with the
Court's holding. Perhaps more importantly, although no claim is
made herein that the family model in fact underlies the military
justice system or that if it does it should continue to do so, the
model does appear to explain at least certain features of the
system.
7 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 444.
78 Griffiths, supra note 68, at 367.
'9 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 447-48.
80 See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
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Even critics of the present military justice system generally
recognize the need for a relationship of trust between service-
men, both among comrades and between officers and enlisted
personnel. 81 A soldier may be asked to risk his life in battle; it is
imperative that he trust his fellows. Further, the military consti-
tutes a whole-life relationship, reaching far beyond the ad-
judicatory process. That the UCMJ affects this whole-life rela-
tionship was a main ground of the Levy decision. The military
roles of Government as "employer, landlord, provisioner, and
lawgiver rolled into one"82 suggest one obvious conclusion in
terms of the model: the Government is the "parent" of the mili-
tary "family"; 83 the commander is, so it seems, the father surro-
gate. It thus makes sense to speak of a commander using non-
judicial punishment to take "a youngster". "out to the
woodshed."8 Nonjudicial punishment is the sort of informal
correction suited to the family relationship-there is no sense of
setting the offender apart, because he is still "one of us."
The family model of the military justice system also serves to
explain why Article 134 is open ended. 85 Given the family
model's premise of mutual trust, the possibility of abuse is not
regarded as a major flaw; the entire adversary idea is foreign to
the model. An open-ended provision anticipates those unpre-
cedented offenses that, in Llewellyn's term, can be "forefelt,
' 86
though not written down. The model explains why the 'judge"
in the military system was originally, in adversary terms, a com-
bination judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel.87 To the extent
the family model is accurate, one person can play all three roles,
because the roles do not exist in the sense that they do in a battle
system; there is no one in the institution whose function it is to
convict the offender. Instead, the goal is to bring the erring
individual back into the mainstream of the unit. He, therefore,
does not need a "defense" as we generally use that term.
81 See, e.g., Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679,
1681, 1682 (1971).
82 417 U.S. at 751; see text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
83 This seems to have been the view held by Mr. Justice Holmes in White v. United
States, 270 U.S. 175, 180 (1926), where he observed that "the relation of the Govern-
ment to the soldiers if not paternal was at least avuncular."
84 See Hearings, supra note 61, at 299.
85 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
86 See text accompanying note 67 supra.
87 See L. Ashlock, The Military Trial Judge 6 (1972) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, on
file at Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania).
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Once it is recognized that an unarticulated family model
may be presupposed by defenders of the military (and by the
Court), one can begin to see why some reform suggestions strike
the defenders as nonsense. For example, to codify all Article 134
offenses, and thereby protect against some kinds of official
overreaching,8 8 only makes sense to one operating outside the
family context.8 9 A similar vice is seen to infect proposals to
curtail command influence; 90 the analogy would be to curb par-
ental influence within the family. Reform proposals that assume
an adversary model are bound to seem incoherent to those who
accept the assumptions of the family model.9
V. THE MODEL AND THE REALITY
This Article so far has stressed the coherence of viewing
military justice as a family-type structure. Yet it is unlikely that
the system was designed with any particular social model in
mind. The elements of the system may be reconcilable with no
single conceptualization; elements fitting different models may
coexist with various degrees of tension, in what Llewellyn called
(in a different context) "a sort of institutional semi-schizophre-
nia."'92 In fact, some elements of the military justice system
88 See generally Rothblatt, Military Justice: The Need for Change, 12 W14. & MARY L.
REv. 455, 479 (1971); Sherman, supra note 1, at 78-82.
89 One point may cause some confusion at this juncture. The relationship between
the development of procedural safeguards and the vagueness or exactness of the sub-
stantive law to be enforced is one of correlation only. Knowledge of one does not allow
definition of a full model for a criminal justice system in the absence of the other. It is
more harmonious to have open-ended provisions of substantive law in a family model
context; the homogeneity of the society gives a type of fair warning of the behavior
proscribed. It is tempting to think that the converse of this is logically compelled-that
the adversary model requires a more definite exactness in the substantive matrix. But
history is not so generous. The common law procedure was an adversary one, yet the
common law tolerated very vague definitions of offenses. Common law crimes-acts
violating no statute but condemned by the courts as counter to the public welfare, still
exist in England and some states. See, e.g., Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,
[1961] 2 W.L.R. 867 (H.L.); Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d
788 (1955). This court power to declare acts criminal generally is limited, however, to
the creation of misdemeanors, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Branch, 207 Pa. Super. 137,
215 A.2d 392 (1965), which may serve to make it more palatable. Such a sugarcoating is
unavailable in the military context, as the text of Article 134 makes clear.
90 See, e.g., West, supra note 44, at 151-55.
91 Llewellyn points out that "the book," the written Code, serves as a check on the
parent-or commanding officer-who never should have been granted that power at
all. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 449-50. Giving the argument its full weight, Llewel-
lyn still sees the military in family model terms. Just as child abuse laws do not destroy
the family, so some external limits do not eliminate the family model.
92 Compare K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 66, at 446 (discussing a system that uses
adversary-type trials and then moves into a pure cure-and-prevention line of treatment,
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look like components of an adversary system, in which the ac-
cused soldier and the Government do battle, while other ele-
ments fit the family model of conciliation and reintegration of
the "erring brother" into society.
A. The Rights of Servicemen
Outside the realm of Article 15 (informal) punishments,
93
there are many procedural safeguards in the military justice sys-
tem. In major cases, military "defendants" have appointed
counsel; 94 in some areas servicemen may have greater protection
than civilians. 95 As noted previously, 96 this sort of protection
makes sense only in an adversarial structure. The commentators
disagree whether these rights are constitutionally protected or
are merely statutory grants by Congress that may be revoked at
any time.97 Although perhaps unanswerable, this question is of
moment for the purposes of this Article because it concerns the
fundamentality of adversary proceedings to the military justice
system. With Levy the Supreme Court has recognized certain
powers of commanding officers to be fundamental to the func-
tioning of the military. Consistent with a family model, these
powers are inconsistent with a battle model of justice. To the
extent courts have held that certain civilian procedures are con-
stitutionally guaranteed, 98 elements of adversariness must be as
deeply ingrained in the military as familial elements.
Right now, only a suggestion for reconciliation of these dis-
parate elements of military justice can be made. Perhaps for
and arguing that the institution has an incoherent view of the individual), with Griffiths,
supra note 68, at 379 (remarking on "the curious dichotomizing which puts so wide a
gulf between criminal law and procedure, and penology," and arguing that the battle
model, because it ignores the punishment stage, cuts the criminal off sharply at the
point of conviction).
9" See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
94 A "major case" limitation may be the result of Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S. Ct.
1281 (1976).
" See, e.g., Kent, Practical Benefits for the Accused-A Case Comparison of the U.S.
Civilian and Military Systems of Justice, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 186 (1970); Moyer, supra note
43.
96 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
97 See generally Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975) ("[I]t must be
assumed that the military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional
rights."); Henderson, supra note 36, at 293; Weiner, supra note 36, at 294; Note, Con-
stitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 CoLuM. L. REV. 127 (1964); Note,
Courts-Martial vs. Constitutional Guarantees, 17 U. PiTT. L. REV. 454 (1956); text accom-
panying notes 33-39 supra. The readings the commentators give to the history diverge
greatly.
98 Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766-68 & nn.4 & 5 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
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serious (non-Article 15) and well defined (non-General Article)
offenses, the military feels that the possibility of genuine struggle
is too great, and the possibility of brotherly reintegration too
small, to allow informal family-type procedures to continue; a
battle is inevitable, in which civilian-type procedures are needed.
B. The Structure of Military Authority
Family authority is primarily individual-centered, 99 and at-
tempts to reach appropriate answers to problems as they arise.100
Power is ascribed to parents by their status, not delegated to
them by higher authority, and its exact nature may remain un-
certain until it needs to be used.1 ' This uncertainty is necessary
in order to deal with new developments in an all-encompassing
relationship; generally, a parent does not attempt to determine
outcomes by unbending rules.' 0 2 In short, the relationship is
flexible, despite the ordering that may exist in particular
families.' 0 3 On the other hand, delegation and precise limitation
on the authority of both law enforcement officials and judges are
vital parts of both a fully developed adversary system of justice
and a rational bureaucracy.
Authority in the military looks in some ways like individual-
centered family authority and in others like bureaucratic author-
ity. A family-authority description once came close to fitting the
structures of authority in military organizations. In the past,
such organizations had basic two-level structures. The civilian
aristocracy provided the officers while the lower classes provided
the soldiers.' 0 4 Ignoring for the moment possible authority
structures within each class, it is reasonable to equate the officers
with the parents of the family model for the purpose of analyz-
ing the way authority was limited and handled. 0 5 Like its paren-
9 Damagka, supra note 72, at 509-10. I do not use Professor Damagka's term
"coordinate," id. 509, because the implication of that term seems to be that authority is
shared horizontally. This is not necessarily the case with the family model.
00 Id. 509.
" Cf. id. 516. Child abuse laws are left out of the account here. Child abuse may
well exemplify a breakdown of the family model. For purposes of this Article, the point
is made if it is conceded that, within the parameters of those laws, there is a wide range
of discretion left open.
1 0 2
1d. 510.
103 Id. 531-32. The usage here departs from Professor Dama~ka's.
104 M. JANOWITZ, SOCIOLOGY AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 28-29 (rev. ed.
1965).
105 By no means is it suggested that officers and soldiers fit the family model in all
other ways. Cf. id. 43.
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tal equivalent, military authority was ascribed. One was born to
officership with little regard to one's achievements or skills. 10 6
Over time, both the makeup of the military and the struc-
ture of military authority changed. Soldiers became less an un-
ruly mob of streetfighters, and more a cross-section of civilian
society. 10 7 Professionals displaced gentleman soldiers,10 8 and the
idea that one could achieve authority grew.' 0 9 In short, the mili-
tary became bureaucratized."10 Each position gradually was as-
signed a place in a hierarchy, and each officer was subject to
strict control and discipline in the conduct of his office. Opera-
tions became governed by rules;"' what discretion there was
flowed to the higher offices."
2
The military hierarchy, therefore, is a far cry from the
paradigm of the individual-centered structure of authority as-
sociated with the family model. In the hierarchy, positions of
super- and sub-ordinance are sharply defined.' 1 3 Moreover,
there is a distinct separation of the office from the individual
who occupies it." 4 John Doe has certain authority because he is,
for example, a major, and other majors have somewhat com-
mensurate authority. Orders are issued by authority of "the
commanding officer," not of a specific person." 5 Thus, the de-
cision of an officer at one level can only be changed by his hier-
1
0
6 Id. 29. Some commentators and participants have never moved beyond this
stage, and still view the military as made up of headstrong and rowdy young men who
need to be controlled by the commanders from the higher classes. See, e.g., J. BISHOP,
supra note 49, at 23.
17 See Bruton, supra note 49, at 1502-03; Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at
400.
10 M. JANOWITZ, supra note 104, at 30.
109 Id.
'"'See generally C. COATES & R. PELLEGRIN, MILITARY SOCIOLOGY: A STUDY OF
AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND MILITARY LIFE 95-113 (1965).
111 Id. This is, of course, part of the classic Weberian definition of bureaucracy. See
M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 330, 333 (A. Hender-
son & T. Parsons trans. 1947). The concepts used in this Article, however, are not
purely Weberian, and the reader should be wary of the reading more into the language
than was meant.
112 C. COATES & R. PELLEGRIN, supra note 110, at 101.
113 See Damaika, supra note 72, at 484.
114Id.
1 C. COATES & R. PELLEGRIN, supra note 110, at 109. In contrast to a pure
bureaucracy, see Damaika, supra note 72, at 486, there is a sense in which lateral entry
within the military is possible because of the personal authority inhering in one's rank.
For example, a colonel in one division may move into another; he will still be a colonel
in his new division. Thus, although it is accurate to describe military authority as
primarily structured hierarchically, see id. 483-509, the military does not fit any concep-
tual structure without some bulging at the seams. Mindful of this caveat, one may fruit-
fully analyze the military as embodying an essentially hierarchical structure of authority.
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archical superior;1 16 the structure itself places a premium on
certainty of decisionmaking. 117 For example, the authority con-
vening a court-martial chooses as members those who are com-
petent in a bureaucratic sense-those who are "best qualified
for the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience,
length of service, and judicial temperament" ' 1 8-rather than
the naive cross-section of the community that makes up a civilian
jury.
The foregoing is an incomplete description, but is sufficient
to show that the structure of military authority is different from
an individual-centered structure. Yet the family model of a crim-
inal justice system seems to employ just such a structure of au-
thority. One might conclude, therefore, that there is a funda-
mental inconsistency in trying to analyze the military in terms of
the family model.
Such a conclusion, however, would not be entirely accurate.
The military may well order authority along bureaucratic lines,
but it nonetheless has undeniably personal features. To see them
one must look not at an organization chart, but at the total rela-
tionship between the commanding officer and the soldier. The
military, after all, ultimately must be able to function as a fight-
ing force, and the sacrifice that a soldier may need to make is not
commonly inspired by civilian bureaucracies. For the military to
function properly, there must be a "we-ness," a sense of
togetherness" 9 not found in a bureaucracy where both the au-
thority of a supervisor and the relationship among equals and
between unequals is limited to specific subject matter.
Nevertheless, there is no theoretical reason why such loyalty
can never exist within a bureaucracy.120 It was noted previ-
116 See Dama~ka, supra note 72, at 484. It might be thought that such a structure
militates against the flexibility of nonjudicial punishment. See text accompanying notes
58-62, 82-84 supra. Once the vertical ordering of authority is taken into account, how-
ever, the fog clears. The commanding officer has substantial rank, and its concomitant
authority and discretion.
117 Dama~ka, supra note 72, at 491. For a traditional illustration of this regarding
court-martial verdicts and voting ("hung juries" do not exist within the military justice
system), see Rothblatt, supra note 88, at 469.
18 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
119 See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 34, at 484; Note, Imprisonment for Debt: In the Military
Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679, 1681, 1682 (1971).
120 Some historians see traditional Chinese society as a bureaucracy based on per-
sonal loyalty to one's superior, and eventually to the Emperor. See generally T'uNG-Tsu
CH'0, LAW & SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961); K. LATOURETTE, THE CHINESE:
THEIR HISTORY & CULTURE 450-80 (4th ed. 1962).
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ously' 2 I that in the old military there was a much more paternal
relationship between officers and enlisted men, based on class
distinctions. But military rank is not a new idea, and both of the
old classes in fact had hierarchies which looked similar to those
of the modern military. What was missing, of course, was the
specialization brought on by modern military technology. A
fighter pilot must trust his ground mechanic completely, but not
quite in the same way the old infantryman would have had to
have trusted his fellows or his commander in a pinch. So long as
the relationship that the military fosters among comrades and
between commander and subordinate encourages the proper in-
teractions, the type of overall organization that the military pos-
sesses may still encourage a family-type social structure.
Thus, it is possible to identify these family elements without
denying the hierarchical structure of military authority. And it is
apparent that the Court in Levy, though it may have been either
right or wrong on both its facts and its moral judgement, at least
employed a workable conceptual framework.
That family-type relationships can exist within a bureau-
cracy, however, does not mean that the modern military
bureaucratic structure puts no pressure on its justice system to
become at least partly adversarial. Insofar as a modern soldier
lives less within his unit than did his predecessors, and more in
working contact with other units and with the outside world, the
close personal bonds of the military tend not to form. If he is
punished, the modern soldier does not feel that his own group is
punishing him, but rather the Army or the Government. To the
extent that servicemen and officers feel this way, the sharing of
assumptions needed to prevent a family structure of justice from
becoming despotic does not occur. Demands therefore arise for
"due process" protection from the military by its own members,
while the increasing specialization of the armed forces allows the
development of a more independent legal branch to operate the
adversary system.
C. An Impure Model
The foregoing discussion should make clear that the mili-
tary justice system does not fit either a pure adversary or pure
family model. But an impure model, at once combining both
121See text accompanying notes i04-06 supra.
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family and adversary elements and explaining the current mili-
tary justice framework, can be constructed.
At the first level, the present system operates in predomin-
antly family model terms. In day-to-day interaction, nonjudicial
punishment provides a means for enforcing rules without treat-
ing the erring individual as an outsider (defendant). The com-
manding officer has wide discretion in deciding when and what
to chastise, but in turn the actual chastisement is statutorily lim-
ited to certain more or less minor deprivations. 122 Adversary
principles are incorporated by the limitations so placed on non-
judicial punishment. Maximum discretion entails maximum pos-
sibility for abuse of power. To protect against such abuse and yet
still preserve the flexibility of discretion, the sanctions that can
be imposed are strictly limited, and the accused is given the right
to opt out of nonjudicial discipline and demand a court-martial.
At the level between nonjudicial punishment and a full
court-martial is the summary court-martial. 12 3 It is not deemed
to be a full adversary proceeding,1 24 but rather an informal but
structured proceeding for offenses considered more serious than
those that are to be treated by nonjudicial punishment. In a
summary court, there is no prosecutor or defense counsel. The
presiding officer acts as counsel and factfinder. Since the of-
fenses heard by a summary court are more serious than those
resolved by nonjudicial punishment, the sanctions available at
the summary court level are correspondingly more severe. 12 5 To
protect against abuse, there are certain procedures governing
conduct of the court, and the accused again has the right to opt
out of the summary procedure entirely and be tried by a special
or general court-martial.
126
Finally, the most adversarial of structures is imposed on the
general court-martial. Proceedings resemble civilian trials, with
lawyer judges and lawyer counsel for both the prosecution and
the defense.' 27 General courts-martial are authorized to award
122 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
123 See Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976).
124 Id. at 1290.
125 The maximum punishments are: one month confinement at hard labor; 45
days' hard labor without confinement; two months' restriction to specified limit; forfei-
ture of two-thirds pay for one month. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 20, 10
U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
126 Id.; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 79 (1969).
127 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Arts. 16, 25, 26, 27, 38, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816,
825, 826, 827, 838 (1970).
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any lawful sentence, including death.' 28
It is at this level, where nearly full adversary procedural
protections are given to the accused, that the general articles
come into play. They preserve the tie with the family model that
is felt to be required by the whole-life relationship between the
military and military personnel. Because it is impossible, in such
a relationship, to foresee all possible acts that may need disci-
pline, Congress has left a residual power in the military system to
deal with such cases. At the same time, however, possible abuse
of that power is restrained by the procedural safeguards and
right of appeal built into the general court-martial structure.
The three tiers of the military justice system can be concep-
tualized as an impure model, combining family and adversary
elements in different amounts at different levels. As noted
earlier, 129 this mixing can lead to structural tension of its own,
for the military is attempting to be both parent and state, both
the head of a family and the prosecutor in court. Insofar as the
model accurately reflects the existing factual situation, it must
reflect this problem. As this Article has tried to show, neither
pure model allows the military justice system to function with
due regard for its whole-life relationship with, and life or death
control over, military personnel. A pure adversary model is in-
sufficiently flexible. A pure family model is too coercive and
open to abuse. The tensions inherent in blending these two areas
of concern are reflected in the impure model proposed here.
VI. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
At this point the debate must shift gears. Attempts to re-
form the military justice system are neither new nor abating.
Even the system's staunchest advocates admit that it is not
perfect.' 30 But neither the reformers nor the defenders have
articulated the theoretical structures underlying their views.
Once such structures are bared, it becomes clear that the two
sides are moving from different starting points and towards dif-
ferent goals. The failure to deal with this reality has left the
parties moving past each other, missing the real core of their
dispute. The military and the Supreme Court seem to view the
military justice system in terms of the impure family model. The
128 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970).
129 See text accompanying note 92 supra.
130 See, e.g., J. BISHOP, supra note 49, at 300-05.
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potential reformers seem to dispute such a view. Now, the de-
bate must shift to an evaluation of the impure family model in
normative terms. Although a thorough examination must be left
for another time, some suggestions along these lines can now be
made.
This author believes that the dangers of applying a pure
family model bulk larger than the concomitant benefits. To im-
pose a structure that relies on a high degree of homogeneity'
3 '
on a system the size and complexity of the military can have
several undesirable results. As a factual matter, this homogeneity
seems not to exist in the military today; 13 2 Captain Levy was not
an isolated case. Many people, both within and without the mili-
tary, shared his views on Vietnam. To accept a model that as-
sumes homogeneous views and beliefs within a society, in the
face of clear evidence that such homogeneity does not exist,
seems perverse. Indeed, because our society is heterogeneous, it
might well be dangerous to have a military force whose views did
not, at least in some rough fashion, parallel those of society at
large. Fundamentally, the pure family model is suited to
[T]ribal cultures or . . . those modern societies that at-
tempt to restrain antisocial conduct independently of
state authority. . . . But from the moment the state
appears as a factor of any significance . . . the parental
ideology may rightly be regarded with some circum-
spection, for it may provide a rationalization for the
most brutal kinds of governmental oppression.
33
The military plainly is not the sort of simple society that tries to
restrain conduct by means other than state authority. The whole
command structure and hierarchy is such an exercise of author-
ity. Failure to obey an order results, not in social pressure, but in
state-imposed punishment.
The pure adversary model also seems unsuitable as a base
for the military justice system. First, of course, some credence
probably is owed to the idea of "military necessity," the need for
a prompt and sure method of enforcing discipline in a fighting
force. More fundamentally, an adversary system functions best
in a situation where prosecutor and defendant do not have to
131 See text accompanying notes 67-68, supra.
132 See Bruton, supra note 49, at 1502-03; Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 1, at
400.
133 Dama~ka, supra note 72, at 531.
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work together after their encounter in those roles, where they do
not constantly interact in a whole-life relationship. In civilian
society, this is seldom a problem. In situations where it might
become a problem (for example, a district attorney prosecuting
his own assistant for misfeasance), we generally respond by say-
ing that the situation engenders a conflict of interest and get an
outside prosecutor. In a military society, this option is not as
available. Admittedly, prosecutors can be imported from units
other than the defendant's, but it is the commanding officer of
the defendant's unit who convenes the court-martial. Absent un-
usual circumstances, it is probable that a defendant would resent
his commanding officer if the two were placed in a formal ad-
versary posture. Although no evidence has been discovered re-
garding the effect of such resentment on morale and fighting
efficiency, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that putting
the commander in a pure adversary relationship with his troops
would make those troops less ready to fight and (perhaps) die at
his command. An adversary relationship would work against the
"we-ness" needed in a fighting force.
The impure family model appears to withstand these criti-
cisms. The evolution of the three levels within today's military
justice system has provided a means by which both familial and
adversary elements can be preserved, the availability of the latter
serving as a check on possible abuses of the former. Nonjudicial
punishment allows the system to restrain individuals while pre-
serving the "we-ness" necessary to the military and inherent in
the family.
Summary courts-martial are a halfway house: the family
ideals are still operative but the adversary mechanism begins to
intrude as the possible sanctions become more severe. Because
there is more power at this level than at the level of nonjudicial
punishment, the possibility of misuse of such power is consi-
dered more dangerous. Hence the possibility of abuse is limited
by imposing certain adversarial restraints on the process as part
of the summary court-martial procedure. Still, the adversary
elements are limited. There is neither prosecutor, nor defense
counsel, and a single commissioned officer presides over the
court.
Finally, there is the general court-martial. This is a full ad-
versary proceeding, with full procedural protection for the ac-
cused. It is only at this level, where all safeguards are operating,
that the general articles of the UCMJ come into play. They pre-
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serve the connection with the family model by recognizing the
whole-life relationship between the military and its personnel. At
the same time, the potential for abuse of the articles is restrained
by the formality and adversary nature of the general court-
martial procedures themselves. While the adversary elements of
a general court-martial carry some danger to the "we-ness" of
the fighting force, these risks may be necessary in order to have
the protection against arbitrary action at this level that the ad-
versary system provides.
Although these conclusions can, of course, be disputed, they
do appear to underlie the actions of the Supreme Court in this
field. Perhaps more importantly, they provide a coherent
framework in which questions about the future structure of
American military justice can be raised and argued.
